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I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

McClellan was denied his day in court even though he raised several legal
defenses that could be proved by the evidence should the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
be followed.
Appellee's brief tries to justify this miscarriage of justice through two
fundamental misconceptions. The first misconception is that since the allegations of the
complaint made out a prima facie case, McClellan was not entitled to his day in court.
The proposition is so absurd as to hardly require rebuttal. Black's Law Dictionary defines
prima facie as "a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the
contrary." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1979) (emphasis added) The basis for
McClellan's appeal is that he was not given opportunity to disprove the prima facie case
Plaintiff alleged.
Mountain America's parole evidence argument may be interesting to the trial
court .after the facts are examined to determine if the parole evidence rule can apply to
the facts of this case. But, whether the parole evidence rule is applicable is itself a factual
issue that was never examined in the court below and cannot now provide a ground for
affirmance on appeal.
The second misconception that threads its way through appellee's brief is
that McClellan was denied his day in court because of his own delay in asserting his
case. Of course, the original miscarriage -- entry of judgment on a motion to dismiss -occurred in the face of a timely and adequate defense asserted by McClellan in his
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answer. There were delays later in the case. However, the delays were caused by
Mountain America's failure to comply with the rules of civil procedure and withdrawal of
McClellan's lawyer during an aborted appeal McClellan was diligently pursuing.
Ironically, the major delay in this case is Mountain America's delay in filing
the claim against McClellan. The complaint was not filed for nearly five years after the
maker of the note defaulted. When the claim was brought, it did not name the maker of
the note or the major players in the business operation, but singled out the small fry who
least understood the business transactions. The claim also failed to put McClellan on
notice that the loan had been secured and Mountain America had let the security slip
through its hands during the five year delay.
Mountain America argues that McClellan's motion to set aside the ill
considered judgment on the pleadings was properly denied because it was not brought
until eight months after the entry of judgment. What Mountain America fails to point out
is that the eight month delay resulted from Mountain America's default in failing to give
McClellan notice of the judgment as required under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A(d)
and Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration.
Mountain America also suggests that McClellan's motion to set aside
judgment on the basis of the one action rule and his motion to amend to assert crossclaims and third party claims are untimely because they came 22 months after the ill
founded judgment on the pleadings. Again, Mountain America fails to point out the fact
that McClellan had diligently pursued an appeal of the judgment on the pleadings that
aborted and was not remanded to the District Court until a few months prior to his
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motion. In the interim, while the case was pending on appeal, McClellan's lawyer was
elevated to the bench leaving McClellan unrepresented. Mountain America never gave
McClellan notice to retain new counsel or appear in person as required by Utah Rule of
Judicial Administration 4-506.

Nevertheless, in October 1991, McClellan hired new

counsel who immediately filed the motion to set aside judgment so that McClellan could
assert the one action rule and the motion to amend to assert a cross-claim and third party
claims.
There has been no lack of diligence on McClellan's part. Only a miscarriage
of justice, followed by the failure of Mountain America to fulfill its duties under the rules.
McClellan should not be deprived of his day in court on so flimsy a record.
II. ARGUMENT

A.

MOUNTAIN AMERICA CONCEDES THAT MATTERS
OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS WERE NOT CONSIDERED BY
THE COURT IN GRANTING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS. THEREFORE. THE JUDGMENT MUST
BE REVERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE
MCCLELLAN'S ANSWER RAISED LEGAL DEFENSES TO THE
CLAIM.
On page 19 of Appellee's Brief, Mountain America admits There is no

evidence in the record that the District Court considered matters outside the pleadings."
With this fact established, the Court of Appeals should summarily reverse
the decision of the District Court because McClellan clearly raised a defense in his answer
that precluded entry of judgment on the pleadings. In response to the allegation in the
complaint that "Defendants executed and delivered to Plaintiff a promissory note or
installment loan agreement," [record 2] McClellan answered "The Defendant admits that
3

he executed the promissory note or installment loan agreement, but affirmatively asserts
that his execution of that agreement was in his capacity as the secretary of the Callistoga
Court Club. Inc." (emphasis added) [record 10] In addition, McClellan's answer raised
as an affirmative defense: "Plaintiff's complaint asserts a liability for a promissory note
which is a corporate liability not personal liability, and Defendant Robert E. McClellan is
being sued personally."
These assertions in the answer, if established by the evidence, constitute
a legal defense to the Plaintiff's claim. Valley Lane Corporation v. Bowen. 592 P.2d 589,
592 (Ut. 1979) By Mountain America's own admission, McClellan's defense to this case
was prematurely arrested in violation of the rules governing judgment on the pleadings.
Mountain America tries to obfuscate this obvious glaring error by arguments
that McClellan's defense would be difficult to establish. Of course, the difficulty of the
case he has to prove should not deny McClellan his day in court.

1.

McClellan's second signature on the Note does
not conclusively establish personal liability on
the Note.

Mountain America makes the bold assertion that "the Note conclusively
establishes that McClellan .also signed the Note in his personal capacity." Appellee's brief
at 10. Curiously, in support of this proposition, Mountain America cites authorities that,
at most, support a claim that the second signature makes McClellan Prima Facie liable
on the Note. See 12 Am.Jur.2d Bills and Notes § 1172 (1964). Even if the Note itself
establishes Plaintiff's prima facie case, McClellan cannot be denied his day in court where
his answer raises a legal defense. Prima Facia evidence is only "a fact presumed to be
4

true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth
Edition (1979). McClellan is entitled by virtue of his answer to a day in court to prove the
prima facie case false.
Mountain America's argument illustrates the wisdom in preventing judgment
on the pleadings just because Plaintiff may have a prima facie case. Mountain America
opines "Why would one sign the same Note twice for the same corporation?
Furthermore, why would one sign the Note in two distinctly different ways, allegedly
fulfilling the same function?"
When asked in a vacuum, these questions may appear to create doubt that
McClellan can avoid personal liability on the Note. But can there be any doubt that
McClellan would be absolved of personal liability on the Note should Mr. Froyd, the
bank's representative, testify that he instructed Mr. McClellan to make the second
signature because the first signature was made out of Mr. Froyd's presence and it was
bank procedure that the loan officer had to witness the execution of the Note, and that
he further assured Mr. McClellan that the second signature would not create personal
liability for Mr. McClellan? McClellan must be given his day in court to attempt to
establish this scenario or any number of other "sets of facts that support his defense."
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd. 795 P.2d 622 (Ut. 1990). To do otherwise would allow
Mountain America judgment upon "its own version of the facts." Strand v. Associated
Students of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Ut. 1977).

5

2.

The Parole Evidence Rule cannot be applied
without a factual inquiry.

The gravaman of Mountain America's parol evidence argument is that the
installment loan agreement unambiguously makes McClellan personally liable and
therefore, any attempt to explain the reason why McClellan signed a second time is
barred by the parol evidence rule. However, that argument assumes, without any basis
in fact, that the agreement was unambiguous and that it is an integrated contract.
Whether or not the agreement was ambiguous as to who was liable for payment is a
question that has never been addressed or answered by the court. Similarly, the court
never examined whether the agreement was integrated.

In its argument, Mountain

America places itself in the position of the court and affirmatively states that there is no
ambiguity.

By so assuming, Mountain America asserts that the court could not go

beyond the "unambiguous" four corners of the note and take extrinsic evidence from
McClellan and Hoyt that established that the bank officer represented that their second
signature on the note did not indicate a personal obligation for payment, but was only
necessary to allow the bank to process the loan application.
Examination of the agreement shows that there is ambiguity as to whether
McClellan signed to evince an intent to be personally liable. The upper left hand corner
of the agreement states that the maker was Callistoga Court Club, Inc. It does not
include the name of Robert E. McClellan anywhere in the box that is designed for the
maker. Furthermore, there is nothing in the text of the agreement that indicates that
McClellan was a maker. The only place where "maker" is defined is in the upper left hand
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box. The text of the agreement unambiguously states that it is the "maker" that is
responsible for the payment under the agreement. As the cases Mountain America cites
confirm, where there is an ambiguity as to whether the signatories intended to be
personally liable on the note, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the parties' intent.
The Utah Supreme Court has held, where there is a question whether the
contract that is the subject of dispute is an integrated contract, the trial court must make
a finding of fact that the contract is integrated. See Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 638
P.2d 1190,1194 (Utah 1981): Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266
(1972). Without that finding, the court cannot exclude parol evidence. £ie_, 638 P.2d at
1194. No such finding was made in this case.
The case at bar is remarkably similar to a number of cases from this
jurisdiction and others that find no personal liability in circumstances where the individual
is induced into signing the contract with promises of no personal liability. For example,
in Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court was
confronted with a case in which the Union Bank sought to recover on a defaulted
corporate obligation for which Swenson was allegedly liable. Swenson's alleged personal
liability was based on his alleged promise to pay as evidenced by a promissory note. The
trial court granted judgment on the note and precluded all extrinsic evidence as to why
Swenson had signed individually. On appeal, Swenson argued that the parol evidence
was admissible to show that he had been induced by a promise from the bank officers
that his individual signature on the note would not impose liability and that he would not
have signed in the absence of such a promise. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with
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Swenson's position and reversed the trial court's order of judgment against Swenson.
The Swenson case is on all fours with the issues in this case and should be followed in
rejecting Mountain America's parol evidence argument.

See also Berkeley Bank

Coopertives v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980) (affirming jury verdict that note
signatories were not personally liable where signatures were induced by promise that they
were not individually liable).
There is nothing in negotiable instruments law that modifies this general rule.
Mountain America's brief only succeeds in giving that impression through a butchered
quotation of the Utah Statute.
Mountain America quotes Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-403 as follows:
"An authorized representative who signs his own name to an
instrument... is personally obligated if the instrument names
the person represented but does not show that the
representative signed in a representative capacity
The portion Mountain America conveniently left out of states: "except as
otherwise established between the immediate parties".1
It is this exception that McClellan pleaded but was improperly denied the
opportunity to prove. McClellan's evidence will show that the Bank's officer required the
additional signature to satisfy a procedural rule of the bank, but assured the signers that
it would create no personal liability. Between the immediate parties, McClellan will show
that he was not assuming personal liability by the second signature.

The full quote reads as follows: "An authorized representative who signs his own name to an
instrument, except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the
instrument names the person represented but does not show that the representative signed in a
representative capacity . . . . " (emphasis added)
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B.

THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ILL ADVISED JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED EVEN
THOUGH 8 MONTHS PASSED FROM ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
TO THE FILING OF THE MOTION.
It is a long established policy of the law in this state to favor a trial on the

merits and to afford both sides a full opportunity to present their evidence and
contentions as to disputed issues so they may be disposed of on substantial rather than
technical grounds. McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates. Inc. 411 P.2d 129, 130
(Utah 1966). To this end, courts should exercise caution in regard to default judgments
and should be somewhat indulgent in setting them aside. Jd.
It is true that 8 months passed from entry of the judgment on the pleadings
to the filing of the motion to set it aside. However, the reason for the delay was Mountain
America's default in failing to give notice of Judgment as required under Rule 58A & Rule
4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. [Record 43, 56, 62, 83]
In Workman v. Naale Construction. Inc. 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990), this
Court reversed the trial court's failure to set aside a default judgment because the motion
was not filed for more than a year after entry of judgment. On the question of timeliness,
the court centered on the fact that Plaintiff had failed to give Defendant notice of the entry
of judgment as required by various Utah Court rules:
In this case [defendant] moved to set aside the judgment
within about a month after learning that the judgment had
been entered, and her ignorance of the judgment until that
time was due in part to a lack of notice that the plaintiff was
required to provide. [Under rules 58A(d) and rule 4-504] Jd.
at 752.
Similarly, in this case McClellan was given no notice of the entry of judgment
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as required by the rules. When he learned of the judgment, he immediately moved to set
aside the judgment [Record 60]. Mountain America cannot be allowed to rob McClellan
of his day in court where the delay in bringing the motion arises from its own default.
C.

EVEN IF MCCLELLAN'S ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE ONE
ACTION RULE DEFENSE WAS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED ASSERTION OF THE
DEFENSE.
The record is undisputed that Zion's did not foreclose a trust deed that had

priority over Mountain America's trust deed. Mountain America's own exhibit, Addendum
Exhibit "D", shows that the Zion's trust deed was recorded on February 19,1988 over four
years .after the Mountain America trust deed. McClellan is entitled to his day in court to
show that Mountain America's loss resulted from its own failure in its duty to maintain the
collateral.
Mountain America never grapples with the fact that the face of its own
exhibit supports McClellan's position and requires a trial.

It attempts to avoid this

unpleasant reality by asserting that Zions Bank's note was prior in time because it was
recorded earlier, albeit, incorrectly. The gravaman of the argument is that the error in the
description of the property was not "material." In support of that position, Mountain
America cites to Washington v. Slack. 813 P.2d 447 (Mont. 1991). Unfortunately for
Mountain America, Slack does not support its position.
First, the appellate court in Slack was reviewing a trial court determination
that found that the error in the recording was not material. In this case, there has never
been such a determination. Like all other areas of this dispute there has never been a
determination by the court on any substantive issue. Second, the error in Slack did not
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Mary T. Noonan, Court Clerk
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

C O D E

531-7870

PR

6 1993

COURT OF APPEALS

Mountain America Credit Union v. Robert E. McClellan
No. 920217-CA

Dear Ms* Noonan:
The purpose of this letter is to inform the Court of a
recent 9th Circuit case that has come out since filing the briefs
in the above-referenced matter that is currently under
consideration before the Honorable Judges Billings, Garff, and
Greenwood. Please find enclosed copies of this letter, for your
convenience, that might be distributed to these judges.
The case of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v.
Woodside Construction, Inc.. 979 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1992), is
highly relevant to this case. While not authoritatively binding
upon the court, Mountain America Credit Union ("MACU") believes
Woodside's persuasive value is of the highest order.
In Woodside. the president of a corporation obtained a loan
for $912,000 from Alaska Mutual Bank. The note bore the
president's signature below the name of the corporation, on the
line designating his representative capacity as president. It
also bore Gait's signature above the name of the corporation with
no representative capacity designated. Id. at 174. The Alaska
Bank merged with two other banks and became the Alliance Bank,
which retained the Woodside obligation. Eventually Alliance Bank
was closed and the FDIC came to own the Woodside obligation. Id.
Following U.C.C. Section 3-403, the Woodside court held that
a corporate president who signed a promissory note above the
corporate name without any designation of representative capacity
bound himself as endorser in his individual capacity. Id. at
175. This identical provision of the U.C.C. has been adopted in
Utah at Section 70A-3-403, Utah Code Ann. (1992), and MACU cited
to this provision in support of its argument in its brief. See
C:\WES\JBR\McCLELLA.405

Brief of Appellee at 13-14.
Furthermore, the Woodside court held that in this particular
situation, evidence attempting to show that the signer acted in a
representative capacity was inadmissible parol evidence "between
a holder of the note other than the original lender and the
signer . . • because [the signer] cannot supply the missing
ingredient." Woodside, 979 F.2d at 175; see also FDIC v.
Tennessee Wildcat Services, Inc., 839 F.2d 251 (6th Cir.
1988)(issuing similar ruling).
The facts in this case are identical to that in Woodside.
Horizon Thrift ("Horizon") is MACU's predecessor in interest on
the McClellan note. While parol evidence may have been
admissible in a case between McClellan and Horizon, it is not
admissible in a case between McClellan and MACU. Indeed, the
facts of this case make Woodside even more persuasive. In
Woodside, on each signature there was at least some reference to
either the corporation represented or the representative
capacity, but not both. Woodside, 979 F.2d at 175. In the case
currently under consideration, McClellan signed the note a second
time without reference to the corporation represented or his
representative capacity. Following Woodside, as well as those
authorities previously cited in MACU's brief, this Court should
hold McClellan personally liable on the note.
Thank you for your assistance. We look forward to the
Court's rendering of an opinion in this matter.
Sincerely,
READING

J. Bruce Reading
Attorney for MACU

C:\WES\JBR\McCLELLA.405
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of April, 1993, I
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing
Letter to Mary T. Noonan, Court Clerk, UTAH COURT OF APPEALS to
the following:
Blake S. Atkin
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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involve the description of the property that was the subject of the lien, rather it involved
an error in the names of the parties.

Significantly, the Slack court found that the

description on the property was correct. In that regard, Slack supports McClellan's
position. Indeed, an examination of the Slack case shows that where there has been a
property description error in the recording the first properly recorded lien has priority. Jd.
at 449-50 (citing Ponceletv. English. 795 P.2d 436 (Mont. 1990): Ely v. Hoida. 226 P. 525
(Mont. 1924)).
Finally, Mountain America's reliance on Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan
Lodge No. 1453.88 Utah 577,56 P.2d 1046 (1936), rather that the court's recent decision
in Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty. Inc.. 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983), for the correct
application of a lienholder's obligation to insure that a senior lien holder has exhausted
the collateral is misplaced. The language in Lockhart could not be more clear.
Mountain America claims McClellan should lose his day in court because
the one action rule issue was brought to the court's attention in a rule 54(b) motion to set
aside the interlocutory judgment rather than a rule 15 motion to amend the answer and
assert an affirmative defense. Appellee's brief at 26. Curiously, in the next breath,
Mountain America argues that the motion to amend to assert cross-claims and a third
party complaint was properly denied because McClellan did not first move to have the
judgment set aside. Appellee's brief at 38.
The fact that even Mountain America can't make up its mind which should
come first - the motion to set aside the judgment or the motion to amend -- is evidence
of the wisdom in our rules of civil procedure which require focus on substantial justice
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rather than procedural niceties. See Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
As shown in McClellan's opening brief, a motion under rule 54(b) to amend
judgment prior to entry of a final judgment is an appropriate vehicle to use in bringing new
matters to the court's attention that affect its judgment.

See authorities cited in

Appellant's brief at 17 n.6. If the court felt that a motion to amend would be a more
appropriate vehicle, then in the interests of justice, the motion should have been
considered a motion to amend.
D.

MOUNTAIN AMERICA'S ONE ACTION RULE "SANCTION"
ARGUMENT IS INAPPOSITE.
Mountain America cites a number of cases for the proposition that if the one

action rule is not asserted in the first case brought by the creditor, in a later action the
rule can only be used to show a waiver of the creditor's rights in the collateral.
Even if Mountain America's characterization of these cases were correct,
they are completely inapposite. McClellan's motion was not brought in the second action
by the creditor. Instead, by his motion, McClellan sought to show the court that an
interlocutory order it had entered was ill-considered, and he should have been allowed
to assert the defense in the original action brought by the creditor. As shown above, the
substantial delays in this matter were on the part of Mountain America and McClellan has
been diligent in pursuing this case. McClellan had no idea until two weeks before the
motion was filed that Mountain America had failed in its duty to protect the collateral. At
the time the motion was filed, there was no trial date, no discovery cut-off date and no
delay or prejudice would have occurred. Therefore, the motion should have been granted
and McClellan should have been given an opportunity to plead and prove the one action
12

rule defense.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's decision granting judgment
on the pleadings should be reversed and its denial of McClellan's motion to amend to
bring cross-claims and third party claims should be reversed and this case remanded for
trial.
Respectfully submitted this

>

day of August, 1992.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for Appellant
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Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the APPELLANT'S REPLY
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1992, to the following:
J. Bruce Reading
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Clark McClellan
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
201 S. Main #1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Keith F. Oehler
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